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The Positive and the Negative Senses of Freedom 
It is not always clear what "freedom" means, in either popular parlance 
or academic discourse. Nor does the modifier "political" resolve the 
uncertainties, although it should somewhat limit their scope. 1 In an effort to 
elucidate some of the traditional uses of "political freedom" (or "liberty," 
which he considered its synonym), Isaiah Berlin differentiated between two 
classes of political freedom: a negative sense, which pertains to "the area 
within which the s u b j e c t . . . should be left to do or be what he is able to do 
or be, without interference by other persons," 2 and a positive sense, which 
pertains to "the source of c o n t r o l . . . that can determine someone to do, or 
be, one thing rather than another." 3 The negative sense addresses those 
specific things that a person can do unobstructed by others; it is "principally 
concerned with the area of control, not with its source." 4 The positive sense 
addresses the desire on the part of the individual "to be conscious of 
(himself] as a thinking, willing, active being, bearing responsibility for his 
choices and able to explain them by reference to his own ideas and 
purposes." 5 
Whereas the negative sense takes for granted the existence of a self-
aware, suitably developed person whose political freedom can be 
ascertained by listing the activities that are available as options (and from 
which activities that person chooses largely independent of social strictures 
or psychological limitations), the positive sense inquires into the processes 
that are required to produce such a self-aware, suitably developed person. 
The positive sense insists that, without an adequate account of this process 
of personal development, a list of available activities is a seriously 
misleading description of freedom because it ignores the individual's 
capacity to make appropriate use of those activities or to define herself in 
such a way that those activities serve as realizations of her chosen purposes. 
1 The more basic question whether free will exists (or can exist) for anyone is 
not addressed in this paper. The implicit assumption of both Berlin and 
Taylor that free will can be attributed, at least conventionally, to individuals 
is unquestioningly accepted here as a premise. 
2 Isaiah Berlin, Four Essays on Liberty, p. 122 (Oxford University Press, 1969). 
3 Ibid. 
*lbid., p. 129. 
5 Ibid., p. 131. 
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Charles Taylor adopts the separation into negative and positive senses 
of freedom proposed by Berlin and adds the terms "opportunity-concept" 
and "exercise-concept" to flesh out his consideration of them. The 
"opportunity-concept" considers that "being free is a matter of what we can 
do, of what it is open to us to do, whether or not we do anything to exercise 
these options." 6 The "exercise-concept," on the other hand, considers that 
"one is free only to the extent that one has effectively determined oneself and 
the shape of one's life." 7 A person is not "free, on a self-realization view, if 
he is totally unaware of his potential, if fulfilling it has never even arisen as a 
question for him, or if he is paralyzed by the fear of breaking with some 
norm which he has internalized but does not authentically reflect him." 8 
Whereas the negative sense presumes that a more or less complete version of 
what one should be and want is readily apparent, the positive sense demurs 
that the construction of a satisfactory model of the person is a necessary 
condition antecedent to the exercise of freedom. The negative sense suggests 
that a static tabulation of available opportunities for action is a sufficient 
description of freedom. The positive sense insists that there is a dynamic 
exchange between these opportunities for action and the problematic 
disposition of the actor. The positive sense perceives that there is a tension 
between the brute availability of options and an informed awareness of their 
availability, i.e., whether one can articulate the option as an identifiable 
possibility for oneself. There is as well a tension for the actor between his 
meaningful choice to pursue an option in order to fulfill himself and the 
subsequent and persisting uncertainties about whether the option that he 
selected best realizes his (perhaps inchoate) capacities and aspirations. 
Taylor, furthermore, is persuaded that a crude negative sense of 
freedom is not compatible with the intuitions of "a post-Romantic 
civilization which puts great value on self-realization, and values freedom 
largely because of this." 9 The lingering attraction of the negative sense, 
despite its failure to satisfy these post-Romantic intuitions, derives largely 
from its strategically useful simplicity: it is easier to hold "the line around a 
very simple and basic issue of principle , . . . tough-mindedly defined as the 
absence of external obstacles" 1 0 rather than to engage in the defense of an 
evolving exercise-concept that is continually challengeable as to its depth or 
scope or legitimacy or comprehensiveness. But Taylor insists that it is the 
exercise-concept that comports with our intuition that freedom inevitably 
involves discriminations among our varying motivations. "(H]t>r the 
capacities relevant to freedom must involve some self-awareness, self--
6 Charles Taylor, The Idea of Freedom: Essays in Honour of Isiah Berlin, Ed 
Alan Ryan, Oxford, 1979. "What's Wrong with Negative Liberty," Reading 
in Social and Political Philosophy, p. 177 (Oxford University Press, 1986). 
7 Ibid. 
«Ibid. 
9 Ibid., p. 179. 
10 Ibid., p. 178. 
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understanding, moral discrimination and self-control, otherwise their 
exercise couldn't amount to freedom in the sense of self-direction."" The 
strategically useful simplicity of the opportunity-concept is fundamentally 
inadequate to accommodate the diversity and complexity of contemporary 
notions of what freedom means. 
The Background Conception 
Taylor recognizes that a crudely negative sense of freedom can be 
refined to address at least some of his concerns about motivation. According 
to the self-realization view, "you are not free if you are motivated, through 
fear, inauthentically internalized standards, or false consciousness, to thwart 
your self-realization[;]. . . you have to be able to do what you really want, or 
to follow your real will, or to fulfill the desires of your own true self ." 1 2 
Obstacles to self-fulfillment then can be both external (physical obstructions 
to a specific activity) and internal (mental obstructions). And these obstacles 
are subject to "qualitative discrimination" about their "significance," i.e., 
there is a "background understanding that certain goals and activities are 
more significant than others" 1 3 and a discrimination among those goals and 
activities "turns on . . . some sense of what is significant for human life." 1 4 
Taylor recognizes that the application of either a negative or a positive sense 
of freedom "requires a background conception of what is significant, 
according to which some restrictions are seen to be without relevance to 
freedom altogether, and others are judged as being of greater and lesser 
importance."1-1* It may be that the negative sense, on account of its preference 
for simplicity, does not accentuate or forthrightly acknowledge its 
relationship to such a background conception. But this relationship is 
nonetheless the underlying context for its evaluation of which activities are 
relevant to political freedom. Moreover, in so far as humans are purposeful 
beings, "distinctions in the significance of different kinds of freedom . . . 
[must be] based on the distinction in the significance of different 
purposes." 1 6 This background conception therefore is not reducible either to 
an unconscious adaptation to environmental stimuli or to an engagement 
with obstacles in an unreflective, seriatim order but necessarily involves 
judgments that support the conscious pursuit of prioritized purposes. 
Taylor concedes that a negative theory can "cope" with the primary 
thrust of these observations, i.e., that humans make discriminations between 
more or less significant freedoms based upon discriminations among the 
purposes they have, "by simply adding a recognition that we can make 
>' Ibid., p. 179. 
' 2 Ibid., p. 180 
" Ibid., p. 182. 
14 Ibid., p. 183. 
|S Ibid. 
«* Ibid. 
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judgments of significance." 1 7 The addition clearly complicates a statement of 
the negative sense but, at least apparently, it does not confound it nor dilute 
it beyond recognition. However, when Taylor explores these judgments of 
significance, he concludes that the negative sense of freedom cannot provide 
an acceptable account of how the exercise of judgment is accomplished. In 
his examination of the grounds that the individual relies upon to make these 
qualitative discriminations, Taylor identifies the undoing of the negative 
sense of freedom. 
Taylor considers that the positive sense of freedom, on account of its 
recognition of the social dimension of personhood, allows for and, in fact, 
mandates qualitative judgments of significance that refer to standards 
outside the individual person. By contrast, he considers that the negative 
sense of freedom is definitionally committed to the exercise of judgments of 
significance by the individual isolated, at least in terms of authenticating his 
choices, from his social setting. In Taylor's reading of the negative sense of 
freedom, the individual is always the "final arbiter" concerning what 
constitutes a "true, authentic desire or purpose." 1 8 The individual is "the 
final authority as to what his freedom consists in, and cannot be 
second-guessed by external authority." 1 9 
Strong Evaluation 
Taylor justifies these observations about the inadequacy of the negative 
sense (due to the absence of an external authority) with "the fact of strong 
evaluation." 2 0 Because I can identify desires which, though they motivate 
me, are not merely comparatively bad but are absolutely bad, then 1 must 
conclude that when such desires do in fact motivate me, they detract from 
my freedom. These absolutely bad desires "are all things which I can easily 
see myself losing without any loss whatsoever to who I am. This is why 1 
can see them as obstacles to my purposes, and hence to my freedom, even 
though they are in a sense unquestionably desires and feelings of mine." 2 1 
This strong evaluation, which acknowledges that "human subjects are 
not only subjects of first-order desires, but of second-order desires, desires 
about desires," 2 2 makes explicit the challenge of internal obstacles to the 
negative sense of freedom. The person who does what he wants, when that 
means pursuing certain first-order desires which he recognizes are 
absolutely bad, is nonetheless acting freely according to the crude negative 
sense of freedom. But that person is not acting freely, on account of the kind 
of desires that motivate the action, according to the positive sense of 
1 7 Ibid.. p. 184 
1 8 Ibid., p. 186. 
1 9 Ibid., p. 187 
2 0 Ibid., p. 185. 
2 1 Ibid., p. 186. 
2 2 Ibid., p. 184. 
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freedom. Doing what I want to do, as a standard applied independent of an 
account of motivation that ranks competing desires in order to sanction 
some acts as expressive of freedom and to condemn others as subversive of 
freedom, does not comport with the fact of strong evaluation. "We have to 
make discriminations among motivations and accept that acting out of some 
motivations . . . is not freedom, is even a negation of freedom." 2 3 
Additionally, if we are aware of desires that do not promote our 
freedom, we should also allow for the possibility that there are desires which 
we believe promote our freedom but which in fact do not. Because we 
appreciate that some of the desires that motivate us are positively bad, 
"[h]ow can we exclude in principle that there may be other false 
appreciations which the agent does not detect?" 2 4 There are persuasive 
grounds then, according to Taylor, to avoid defining freedom as action 
unless that definition makes satisfactory reference to both the ranking of 
motivations for the action and the prospects for a false appreciation of that 
ranking. But when a negative sense of freedom attempts to accommodate 
these considerations, it is pulled from the simplicity of a listing of available 
activities to an account that is both complicated and tentative. It is 
complicated because it must qualify its list of activities with the proviso that 
conditions those activities as expressions of freedom only if their 
performances are properly motivated. It is tentative because the list of 
activities is attended by the further proviso that it is not always possible to 
determine whether a seemingly proper motivation is actually what it seems. 
A commitment to a negative sense of freedom needs to incorporate an 
account of motivations that satisfies both of these provisos if it is to coexist 
with contemporary notions of freedom as an enlightened self-fulfillment. 
But the radical reorientation necessitated by these proposed modifications 
raises the question whether the negative sense can survive the modifications 
other than as a cumbersome relic of a largely preempted structure. 
Taylor emphatically denies that the negative sense of freedom can be 
reconstructed to accommodate the challenge of strong evaluation. The 
proposal to admit judgments of significance offered an initially plausible 
strategy but it ultimately proves unable to reconcile a ranking of motivations 
(that freedom as self-realization requires) with the negative sense's insistence 
that the individual is the final authority about his desires or purposes. The 
hybrid that would result from incorporating a compelling account of 
motivations within the negative sense is deemed "untenable." The core 
commitment of the negative sense to the individual as the arbiter of what he 
authentically wants precludes second-guessing of his choices by an external 
authority. Thus the privileged position of the individual and his antagonism 
against second-guessing is said to "rule out in principle that the subject can 
ever be wrong about what he wants . " 2 5 But, as Taylor eagerly points out, 
2 1 //>/</., p. 186. 
2 4 Will., p. 191. 
25 Ibid.. p. 187. 
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"how can he never, in principle, be wrong, unless there is nothing to be right 
or wrong about in this matter?" 2 6 Given that there clearly are things about 
which one can be wrong, viz., at the least, undetected but absolutely bad 
desires, the incompetence of the negative sense of freedom to address 
personal error and thus its incompatibility with contemporary expectations 
about freedom as self-realization are apparent. 
The Collapse of the Political into the Personal 
The first criticism of Taylor's analysis is that it is not always clear where 
the boundaries of political freedom lie vis a vis freedom in general and 
personal freedom in particular. He purports to accept the differentiation 
proposed by Berlin, but his development of the contrasting theories of 
political freedom quickly loses track of their political orientation. His 
extensive treatment of the psychology of personal development and the 
importance of authentic self-expression suggests that all political freedoms 
must be viewed through the lens of continuous individual self-analysis. The 
right to vote, for example, might seem a simple political freedom. Or, at 
least, its complexities would seem to pertain to the effectiveness of the vote 
cast, describable in terms of fraudulent tabulation procedures or the dearth 
of viable candidates or some related method of assessment that addresses 
tangible qualities of the value of the franchise. But, pursuant to Taylor's 
analysis, we need to address issues of self-realization when we evaluate this 
right to vote. Presumably, we need to undertake an unbounded study of the 
innumerable possibilities for self-deception when we evaluate that right, e.g., 
does the overwhelming number of voters produce a personal sense of 
futility, or does the low percentage participation of eligible voters contribute 
to a sense of anomie and disaffection, or does participation in the process 
serve to defuse an otherwise accumulating conviction that the democratic 
process is ineffectual, etc., ad infinitum. Pursuant to Taylor's approach, 
there can never be a fixed and firm political freedom. A certain equilibrium 
does not seem inconsistent with his view but it is ever prey to destabilizing 
influences that are borne of an individual's failure to grasp the true 
significance of the freedom involved. Inasmuch as political freedoms are 
significant only to the extent that they serve personal self-realization, their 
relative merits will rise and fall as they are exercised by properly motivated 
individuals, whenever and however we can decide who those individuals 
are. 
It does seem to be the case that political freedom is related to personal 
freedom. From this insight into the impotently nominal nature of a political 
freedom where someone cannot take advantage of that freedom for reasons 
of irrational fear (or some other, absolutely bad, internal obstacle), Taylor 
wrests a comprehensive damning of political freedom unless it means 
self-expression. But acknowledging that there is a relationship between 
2 6 Ibid. 
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political freedom and personal freedom does not justify the collapse of the 
former into the latter. When a distinction is maintained between them, 
every problem for personal freedom is not a problem to the same degree and 
in the same manner for political freedom. 
Surely grave threats to personal freedom have serious ramifications for 
political freedom as well, but those ramifications need to be drawn out 
explicitly against those freedoms that are properly political. Subtle 
hindrances to self-expression, e.g., borne of parental influence or religious 
training, are certainly relevant to the realization of personal freedom but 
those subtle hindrances may be, at best, tangentially related to a sense of self 
as politically free. Short of those situations where such hindrances effect a 
significant and perceptible diminution of that sense of self as politically free, 
one might conclude that problems of personal freedom are largely irrelevant 
to political freedom. And those instances where a significant and 
perceptible impact is detected would justify efforts to either relieve the 
hindrance or modify the political freedom to account for the hindrance. 
At the furthest extreme, a reconciliation of personal freedom with 
political freedom may be impossible because of a glaring deficiency in a 
particular individual's conception of one sense of freedom or the other. A 
negative theory of political freedom need only prefatorily disqualify 
severely disturbed persons in order to address the extreme cases, e.g., 
Charles Manson and Andreas Baader, and it has provided at least a 
plausible (if largely conventional and self-referential) response to the 
problem of absolutely bad motivations. This disqualification procedure 
hardly suffices to reconcile Taylor's ideas about self-realization with a 
negative sense of political freedom. But it does acknowledge that a seriously 
distorted conception of personal freedom is incompatible with political 
freedom and therefore adopts a minimal test of personal competency to 
address the problem of the seriously distorted political player. 
The obvious retort to this simple disqualification procedure is that it is 
not only in the seriously distorted exceptions but also in the routine and 
common instances where an account of personal freedom must underlie an 
account of political freedom. But the insistence upon such a link can be 
accommodated if the two kinds of freedom are consistently distinguished 
from one another. Indeed, a negative theory of political freedom may seem 
vulnerable to Taylorish criticisms about absolutely bad motivations because 
implicitly it already does distinguish between personal and political 
freedom. As a theory of political freedom, it presupposes a separate account 
of personal freedom that addresses instances of absolutely bad motivations. 
That supposition is not part of the negative theory per se and so when the 
negative theory, stripped of the supposition, is criticized for failing to 
satisfactorily address motivations, it does not have a practiced and ready 
rebuttal. 
But this apparent failure is not fatal if it can be unpacked as the 
inadequacy of a negative sense stripped of its motivational presumptions 
rather than the inadequacy of that negative sense supported by those 
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presumptions. Undoubtedly the motivational presumptions of a negative 
sense of freedom will prove to be considerably less rich than the typology of 
motivations developed by Taylor for a positive sense of freedom (and they 
may be ultimately unpersuasive to a theorist committed to the positive sense 
on account of this comparative sparseness). Yet these motivational 
presumptions likely do address, even if at a perfunctory or superficial level, 
problems like absolutely bad motivations. The reason why they are not 
specifically articulated in a negative sense of freedom is that they are not 
deemed properly part of a political theory. Instead, they are considered to 
be part of the theory of personal freedom which underlies and supports that 
theory of political freedom. For the negative sense, theories of political 
freedom are distinguished from theories of personal freedom, at least by 
implication. Inasmuch as they are related but distinguishable, it is not 
surprising that a brief (and unsympathetic) summary of negative political 
theory will not recognize its implicit dependence upon a theory of personal 
freedom. A critique of negative political theory that ignores this 
relationship, especially when that critique insists upon a rich account of 
personal freedom, is likely to misstate the entailments of a negative political 
theory for personal freedom in order to trumpet the more auspicious 
circumstances for personal freedom that lie in a positive theory of political 
freedom. 
The Persistence of External Authority 
Aside from this concern for the unconstrained collapsing of political 
freedom into personal freedom, there is another shortcoming present to 
Taylor's analysis of negative freedom. While the temptation to collapse the 
political into the personal is not unique to Taylor (but instead applies to 
various accounts of the positive sense of freedom), this second concern is 
especially applicable to Taylor. He judges that the negative sense of freedom 
is inadequate to explain absolutely bad motivations (especially when 
undetected) because it is necessarily committed to the individual as the final 
arbiter of her desires and purposes. The individual, so restricted, has no 
assured means of discovering the shortcomings of her desires and purposes. 
No matter how erroneous they may be, i.e., the fruit of undetected and 
absolutely bad motivations, until the individual on her own initiative 
recognizes the shortcomings, she is entitled to and, indeed, must act as her 
desires move her. There is allegedly no motivational hierarchy available that 
acknowledges an external authority according to which those desires are 
deficient. But it is not clear that the negative sense is committed to this 
position that the individual is an uninformed but nevertheless irrefutable 
final arbiter. A bare statement of the negative sense perhaps can be read to 
imply that the individual is an isolated arbiter, but that implication does not 
fit within a fuller account that explicitly identifies an authority to distinguish 
good from bad motivations, to the degree that they become manifest in 
actions, that is external to the individual. 
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It is fairly clear that the negative sense of freedom largely ignores 
concerns about self-realization and false consciousness. To that extent it 
neglects the plight of the individual who cannot take proper advantage of an 
externally unobstructed activity because there are debilitating motivational 
obstacles. It is a less rich and appealing account of political freedom on 
account of that neglect, especially in those instances where political and 
personal freedom are closely intertwined. The freedom of speech, for 
example, is complicated in the example where specific tokens of speech may 
be inimical to both the speaker and the party addressed because of the 
undeveloped (as an example, racist) condition of the speaker. It is a fair 
criticism of the negative sense of freedom that it primarily focuses upon the 
freedom of speech (and its instances) as a freedom exercised by the speaker 
without adequately acknowledging the potential for its abuse of a freedom 
of the listener. 
Despite this prevailing deficiency in apologies for the negative sense of 
freedom, no necessary connection exists between that negative sense and an 
unqualified endorsement of the individual as the final arbiter of their desires 
and purposes. Presumably because the negative sense of freedom does not 
address instances of potential abuse, it can therefore be read to sanction such 
abuses as irreproachably neutral "opportunities" to do something that it is 
open for one to do. But the simplicity of the negative sense does not 
constitute an endorsement of such abuses. The negative sense does not offer 
a persuasive rejoinder to these instances of abuse because it does not 
anticipate motivational complications or because it presumes that an 
underlying theory of personal freedom will resolve the potential for abuse 
before it arises as an expression of political freedom. In either case, there are 
grounds to criticize the negative sense of political freedom for its awkward 
response to instances of abusive political expression. But in neither case 
need the individual be isolated from an external authority as an unavoidable 
entailment of the negative sense of freedom. 
The freedom of speech example is again useful to demonstrate the 
decisiveness and the flexibility of external sources that determine which 
activities are protected as political freedoms. The first statement of the 
political freedom as a right to freely express one's point of view seems direct 
and unequivocal. But when the reach of that definition is curtailed in order 
to exclude fighting words used in certain highly volatile situations or 
declarations of false danger that entail grave risk of public harm or false 
assertions that seriously debase another's professional or personal 
reputation, the negative sense of freedom can and does accommodate such 
curtailments. The explanation may be that these objectionable instances do 
not qualify as speech-acts or, allowing that they are speech-acts, that they are 
trumped by other, weightier considerations (derived from other political 
freedoms). Moreover, the limits of these exceptions are not dependent upon 
an interpretation by each individual as an isolated and final arbiter. There 
are communal standards that govern defamation, for example, and 
individual decisions about what to say about whom are evaluated in light of 
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these external standards. A negative sense of freedom is not hapless when 
challenged with proposed limitations upon a specific freedom nor when 
persuaded of the evolving character of those limitations as functions of 
societal norms. 
A negative theory of freedom may not suitably address the reasons why 
a particular speech act is unhealthy for the specific speaker, given her 
idiosyncratic motivations. But it can and does address the speech act itself 
and it relies upon an authority external to the speaker to make its evaluation. 
Indeed, Taylor's criticism of the negative sense of freedom on the grounds 
that there is an absence of external authority seems misguided. It is true that 
the negative sense attempts little evaluation of the uniquely personal 
motivations that spur individual actions and, to that extent, overlooks 
psychologically penetrating accounts of human behavior. Instead, the 
negative sense evaluates the actions themselves according to their ordinary 
and usual meanings, i.e., according to standards external to the individual. 
The individual's motivations are generally neglected in favor of a description 
of the actions performed. 2 7 The political freedoms that are protected are 
fairly simply described as types of action free from interference and their 
sweep is as wide as is conventionally appropriate to them. Indeed, there is a 
pervasive air of conventionality and mutual accommodation in these 
descriptions that belie Taylor's suggestion that an unbridled egoism lurks 
within the negative sense. 
Rather than ignoring external authority, the negative sense of freedom 
seems vulnerable to criticism for too heavily relying upon such external 
authority in its evaluation of what counts as political freedom. The 
individual's motivations to exercise these freedoms, to the extent that they 
are unaddressed, may not comport with a preferred background conception. 
And so the individual may be allowed to exercise those freedoms for the 
wrong reasons. But the exercise is monitored and directed according to an 
external authority which will interfere when those reasons spill over and are 
expressed in excess of the protections allowed. Bad motivations as such are 
not addressed by the negative sense of freedom, but their expressions in 
action are. The individual cannot effectively serve as the final arbiter of her 
motivations whenever those motivations manifest themselves as actions 
because the actions will be evaluated by an external authority. That 
authority will forcibly interfere and, by interfering, provoke her to reassess 
her motivations. The negative sense of freedom then does provide an 
external authority that encourages a reassessment of a motivation's 
shortcomings when that motivation finds expression in conduct that is 
adjudged unacceptable. Although the individual may be left to form (or 
reform) desires and purposes independent of external authority, that 
individual is certainly not the final arbiter whether the expression of those 
desires and purposes qualifies as a political freedom. 
2 7 Motivations are perhaps considered to the extent that they clarify 
otherwise ambiguous actions. 
